This study examines a number of portfolio disclosure regimes with respect to accuracy and susceptibility to copycat behavior in an environment absent of mandatory disclosure. We find that periodic portfolio disclosure tends to underestimate true excess performance as well as idiosyncratic risk in top-quartile fund managers, with longer interreporting intervals tending to result in greater differences. 'Copycat funds' following the disclosed holdings of top-tier managers significantly underperform the underlying fund, while copycats following bottom-tier managers significantly outperform the underlying fund. Our findings suggest that periodic reporting at monthly intervals or longer would not affect fund alpha generation.
Introduction
We investigate the trade-off between measurement accuracy and the leakage of commercially sensitive (valuable) information when portfolio holdings data is publically reported at varying frequencies and lags. Our study is unique in that we investigate the effect of portfolio holdings disclosure in the Australian regulatory environment, where formalised mandatory portfolio disclosure is absent, in contrast to the U.S. system. This means that funds are able to earn alpha without public scrutiny of their holdings, or the fear of being copied market-wide. Interestingly, Alpert, Rekenthaler and Suh (2013) and fund performance/market quality. However no previous study 2 has investigated the issues associated with switching from no holdings disclosure to some voluntary form of disclosure, usually to asset consulting firms. Our study seeks to address this gap in the research.
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A number of arguments have been presented against both mandatory holdings disclosure and the implementation of more frequent disclosure regimes. The main concern is that third party investors are able to anticipate fund manager trades by looking at their recent holdings positions, and position themselves to front-run. Furthermore, freeloading fund managers may also be able to exploit the costly research that other funds have done through copycat strategies, and potentially undercut these funds on management fees. The combination of these behaviors has the potential to both increase transaction costs for entities that are required to periodically disclose their holdings, and reduce motivation for original research. Fund managers also typically cite concerns that revealing portfolio positions may enable others to reverse engineer their investment processes and strategies, thereby revealing the fund managers' intellectual property (IP).
Our access to high-granularity inter-day trading data enables us to go beyond the implied trades (derived from changes in holdings) that many prior studies have used, and 3 It should be noted that Australia, since 1994, has operated a highly effective continuous disclosure regime for listed companies on the ASX that is policed (now) by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). An alternative disclosure regime for listed firms in the United States (Regulation Fair Disclosure) has operated since enables us to contribute to this literature by investigating factor-adjusted returns and portfolio volatility on a daily level, which has not been previously possible. Our results
show that hypothetical periodic portfolio disclosure tends to underestimate true excess fund performance. However, the measurement error is concentrated in top-quartile performing fund managers, with longer inter-reporting intervals tending to result in even greater differences. We also show that longer intervals between when holdings are disclosed potentially mean that investors may find it more difficult to identify genuinely skilled funds, while at the same time not fully realising the level of diversifiable risk they are taking on by investing in fund managers with top-tier performance.
The second part of this study ascertains the extent to which commercially sensitive information is leaked through periodic disclosure of holdings by simulating 'copycat funds' that emulate the reported holdings of a fund on a delayed basis (with delays ranging from one (1) month to one (1) year). We find that copycat funds, on average, do not perform significantly differently from their underlying funds (with the exception of annual reporting with a one month lag, in which case the copycat underperforms). However, partitioning the funds into performance quartiles show that copycat funds significantly underperform top-quartile funds at lags of six (6) months or shorter, while significantly outperforming bottom-quartile funds at lags of three (3) months or longer.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents prior research on the effects and outcomes of mandatory portfolio disclosure; section 3 describes the data used in this study; section 4 details the research design and empirical results of determining disclosure accuracy and the effectiveness of potential copycat strategies; and section 5 concludes.
Background
Proponents in favor of portfolio holdings disclosure argue that greater availability of historical holdings data enables investors to make better-informed decisions about their choice of investment managers, which enhances competition, reduces fees, and increases the efficiency of the industry as a whole. Indeed, it has been shown that reporting frequency is positively related to the accuracy with which fund manager performance may be measured (e.g., see Bollen and Busse (2001) ), and is an enabling factor for investors to predict future performance (e.g., see Elton, Gruber and Blake (2011) ).
Even without full disclosure, earlier studies have shown that powerful inferences can be made regarding a fund manager's investment ability. For example, Wermers, Yao and Zhao (2012) use holdings-based analysis of fund portfolios to reveal differences in fund managers' abilities to predict firms' future earnings from fundamental factors that are not subsumed by publicly available quantitative predictors. The impact of the "missing data" is also telling. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) annually.
The primary concern that detractors voice against the public disclosure of fund manager holdings is the leakage of commercially sensitive information to competing investors. Agarwal, Mullally, Tang and Yang (2013) show that the SEC's introduction of quarterly holdings disclosure (from semi-annual disclosure) in 2004 led to smaller abnormal returns in superior funds, particularly for illiquid stocks and those which were subject to greater information asymmetry. Parida and Teo (2011) independently confirmed this by showing that semi-annually reporting fund managers with high abnormal returns in periods prior to 2004 no longer outperformed comparable quarterly reporting funds after the introduction of mandatory quarterly reporting. This shift was particularly profound in previously superior funds which held illiquid assets. For other market participants, however, the increased frequency in holdings disclosure led to greater liquidity in stocks with high fund ownership, and improved market quality (see Agarwal et al. (2013) ).
A number of specific reasons have been cited for a decline in the performance of skilled managers in the context of more frequent portfolio disclosure. Wermers (2001) discusses the possibility of total shareholder returns from mutual fund investments decreasing with more frequent disclosure, due to both the front-running of mutual fund trades (e.g. when shifting a position, generating cash during a liquidity call, or for tax-loss selling purposes), and free-riding on fund investment strategies. The latter, known as 'copycat funds', have been shown to earn returns that are statistically indistinguishable, and possibly higher after fees, compared to original funds, when rebalancing is based on semi-annually disclosed fund holdings lagged up to 60 days from the snapshot date (e.g., see Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004) ). Furthermore, Verbeek and Wang (2013) show that the relative success of copycat funds significantly increased after 2004, when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We build on these prior studies by investigating the performance of potential copycat funds across a number of different disclosure regimes, which also indirectly tests the time sensitivity of fund manager trades.
A periodic holdings disclosure regime may also lead to adverse agency effects. For example, Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2013) demonstrate how an informed fund manager,
Data
We use a data set containing daily transactions and monthly holdings from 58
active Australian equity fund managers, spanning fifteen years from 1 January 1996 to 31
December 2010 inclusive. 4 Previous research using this data set (see Chen, Foster, Gallagher and Wermers (2014) ) and broader data sets of Australian fund managers (see Pinnuck (2003) , Fong, Gallagher and Lee (2008)), has shown that fund managers do indeed appear to be skilled and highlighted the potential for copycat funds to exploit disclosed fund manager holdings.
The data were compiled through two phases of collection. In the first phase, carried out in 2002, fund managers were invited to provide daily transactions, holdings and aggregate performance data. These funds were selected in consultation with Mercer Investment Consulting, and were asked to provide information on their largest 5 pooled active 6 Australian equity funds that were open to institution investors. This resulted in data for 33 fund managers who provided the requested data. The sample is skewed towards larger institutions, and is representative of the larger-sized managers available to investment.
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The second phase, carried out in 2011, contributed the monthly holdings and daily trades of the underlying active managers in two large multi-manager funds. The first source comprises 11 underlying funds from a large open-ended fund-of-funds. The second source comprises 14 underlying funds from a large industry superannuation fund. In both cases, permission to collect fund trades and holdings data was sought from and granted by the multi-fund manager with no interaction with the underlying managers.
While this data set represents a restricted sample of Australian active fund managers, we believe it is nevertheless representative of the wider universe. Figure 1 presents the performance of our sample managers compared to the more comprehensive set of managers tracked by the Mercer Performance Analytics (MPA) database. Our data set provides a key advantage over most previous studies on fund manager performance evaluation: the daily transactions contained in our database allow us to evaluate trading performance on an inter-day basis, whereas previous studies (with the notable exception of Puckett and Yan (2011) ) have been limited to, at best, monthly precision (e.g. Bennett,
Gallagher, Harman, Warren and Xi (2013)). When evaluating stock trading ability in an environment of short-lived information and fleeting profitable opportunities, the granularity of data is a critical element (see Kothari and Warner (2001) ). 
Method and Discussion

Accuracy vs. Alpha Leakage
In this section we analyse the reliability of reported portfolios in informing the returns and volatility of the underlying portfolio. The more frequently portfolio holdings are reported, the more accurate inferences regarding its return and volatility structures are likely to be (see Bollen and Busse (2001) ). However, due to the cost of reporting and information leakage constraints, there must be an ideal frequency which facilitates accurate performance measurement, while concurrently protecting valuable intellectual property. In the US, this frequency was determined to be every six (6) months prior to 2004, and every three (3) months subsequently.
The reported portfolios comprise snapshots of the underlying funds taken at varying intervals (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual or annual). The return and risk characteristics of the reported portfolios are then computed using a buy-and-hold strategy that assumes each snapshot remains static until the next discrete snapshot. Performance is measured in terms of raw returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are based on DGTW characteristics-based alpha. The latter benchmarks a stock's daily return against other stocks of similar size, book-to-market ratio and prior return characteristics.
Unlike regression-based methods, it allows excess performance to be determined crosssectionally at high data frequency (see Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) ) for further details on the construction and rationalisation of the DGTW alpha benchmark).
The abnormal return ( !" ) of a stock on day is defined as:
!" is the dilution-adjusted arithmetic return of on day and !" is the return earned by the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio associated with . We follow Pinnuck (2003) in using a 5 x 4 x 3 sort on size, book-to-market ratio and momentum, rather than the 5 x 5 x 5 sort used by Daniel et al. (1997) , to reflect the fact that there are fewer listed stocks on the ASX than on the US market.
Over an -day observation period, we use the cumulative abnormal return ( !,!,! ) as our excess performance measure, given by:
In the following sections, we look at two indicators of how reliably periodically reported portfolios are able to reflect the true performance of underlying funds. Puckett and Yan (2011) demonstrate that fund managers in the United States generate statistically significant alpha in the intra-quartile period between SEC mandated 13F reporting dates. We use Australian trades and portfolio holdings data to investigate whether a similar trend occurs in Australia, and to what extent short-term trade timing ability can be captured by a regime of periodic holdings disclosure. Table 2 , Panel A compares the actual excess return against that inferred from reported holdings at intervals ranging from monthly to yearly. Actual fund returns vary between different reporting intervals, since longer reporting periods typically truncate the data towards the end -e.g. if a fund is included in the data set for 4 years and 9 months, then the final 3 months of data is discarded when measuring semi-annually reported performance, and the final 9 months of data is discarded when measuring annually reported performance. Puckett and Yan (2011) , periodic reporting tends to underestimate true fund performance. The error appears to be most statistically significant at shorter reporting intervals (i.e. monthly and quarterly) though this can primarily be attributed to the smaller sample size when testing longer reporting periods. The small magnitude of mean measurement errors, however, hides the underlying variation between top-quartile performing managers and those in lower bands. Table 2 (Panel B) partitions the funds into quartiles by performance ranking based on mean DGTW alpha, which can only be measured with holdings level data. The results show that periodic holdings disclosure consistently underestimates true alpha for top-performing funds, whereas no such consistency is observed in lower bands. In addition, longer intervals between reporting tend to exacerbate the difference between a top-quartile manager's performance based on their reported portfolio and their true performance.
Expected error over long-term measurements
Estimation errors in the best performing funds are a greater concern than in other funds, since prospective investors seek funds exhibiting evidence of consistent positive skill.
Superior funds may be incentivised to disclose holdings more frequently than the minimum requirement, barring concerns in relation to possible copycatting (which is addressed in the next section).
While returns data is readily available to institutional investors for a wide range of managed funds (e.g. through industry surveys), data on the volatility of these returns are usually less accessible. Regularly disclosed portfolio holdings enable prospective investors to gauge the historical volatility and idiosyncratic risk of each fund through analysis of the reporting positions. Table 3 , Panel A examines the accuracy with which the risk variables of reported portfolios match up with their actual risk. We use the standard deviation of annualised inter-day returns and DGTW characteristic-adjusted alphas to measure volatility and idiosyncratic risk. We do not find statistically significant differences between inferred and actual values of either measure of risk; this result is robust for volatility only when funds are divided by performance (Table 3 , Panel B). Periodic reporting does significantly underestimate idiosyncratic volatility in top-quartile managers across all reporting frequencies (Table 3 , Panel C), and this difference is substantially greater for longer inter-reporting periods. This suggests that top-quartile funds take large active bets in the interim period to drive performance.
Our results suggest that a periodic reporting system understates excess performance for top quartile performing managers, as well as their exposure to inter-day idiosyncratic volatility. Furthermore, the degree of under-reporting for both increases as the inter-reporting period lengthens. This may be an issue for performance-chasing prospective clients, as it makes top-performing funds (ex-post) difficult to identify, while at the same time masking the idiosyncratic risks that they take on to achieve higher alpha.
Copycat Funds
The second part of this study addresses concerns around third parties exploiting the information released by fund managers for their own investment purposes. Specifically, we examine the profitability of a deterministic strategy where an otherwise uninformed investor buys and holds the disclosed portfolio positions of fund managers. This contrasts with front-running methods of exploitation, where savvy investors anticipate the net direction of future trades based on a fund manager's disclosed holdings (e.g. if a fund manager is steadily accumulating a position or needs to sell tax loss holdings at the end of a financial year) and enters the market ahead of the fund manager themselves.
The method we use follows Verbeek and Wang (2013) . Using reported portfolios taken at varying intervals (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annually), we construct copycat funds which lag the snapshot date by a further one, three, six or twelve months. This reflects variations in possible 'grace periods' given to fund managers to lodge their portfolio holdings, similar to the 60-day grace period given to US mutual funds to submit their Section 13F filings. The copycat fund then employs a buy-and-hold strategy on the emulated portfolio until the next holdings snapshot is revealed. For the purpose of this study, we assume that transaction costs for the copycat fund are not significantly different from those of the underlying fund.
We find a large dispersion of copycat fund outcomes relative to their underlying funds, however the mean difference in performance is not significantly different from zero across most reporting frequencies and lag periods (Table 4 ). The bias of the dispersion appears to be related to the performance of the underlying fund managers. To demonstrate this, we partition each fund into quartiles based on their mean DGTW characteristicsadjusted excess returns over the observation period. The hindsight bias introduced by this method effectively allows copycats perfect foresight with regard to fund performance rankings, and hence allows us to determine the effectiveness of copycat funds in the worst case scenario. A number of trends are immediately obvious in the results (Table 5) Trend (a) suggests that top-quartile performing fund managers exploit short-term information advantages and produce significant excess returns through active trading.
Copycat funds following superior managers are not able to capitalise on these timesensitive portfolio changes, and hence are not able to match the underlying fund's performance even when the copycat can identify (and indeed, forecast) which funds will be top-performing. Conversely, bottom-quartile fund managers appear to be selling holdings that subsequently outperform those that they buy. Because the copycat fund delays such trades, we observe relatively better performance in the copycats.
Trend (b) demonstrates that lower reporting frequencies exaggerate the difference between copycat funds and the underlying funds. Top-quartile performing funds outperform their copycats by even greater degrees when the mandated disclosure frequency is lower (e.g. every 6 or 12 months). This is applicable for all lags except the 12-month lag, where the underperformance of the copycat funds is economically significant but not statistically significant. Conversely, bottom-quartile funds are outperformed by their copycat funds to an even greater degree when the reporting frequency is decreased. This may be because, unlike the underlying funds, the copycat funds avoid non-profitable rebalancing during the intra-reporting period.
Trend (c) indicates that longer lags actually enhance the performance of copycat funds following first and fourth quartile funds. For copycat funds following first quartile managers, lagging the disclosed holdings by longer periods reduces the relative underperformance of the copycat. This may reflect the observation made by Chen et al. (2014) that the initial performance advantage of purchased stocks over sold stocks tends to revert over the medium and long term. At a 12-month lag, we find that the difference between copycat funds and underlying top-quartile funds are not statistically significant.
On the other hand, copycat funds following bottom-quartile managers outperform their underlying funds even more significantly (both statistically and economically) when following at longer lags. This suggests that stocks sold by bottom-quartile funds continue to outperform those that they buy over the longer term, up to at least a year out from their respective transaction dates. We find that at the most frequent reporting period (monthly), top-quartile funds still outperform their copycat funds by 0.97% annualised (or 0.64% at a 12 month lag), which more than covers the typical range of institutional management fees 7 . Furthermore, longer lags between reporting increase the advantage of top-quartile funds over copycats. Instituting longer lags between the holdings snapshot date and the public disclosure date does not appear to help protect fund managers' IP. Longer lags actually reduce the performance disadvantage associated with copying a top-tier fund, and increase the outperformance achieved when copying a bottom-tier fund.
Conclusion
Our study examines the potential impact of introducing mandatory portfolio holdings disclosure with respect to a market that currently has no mandated holdings disclosure regime. For Australia, by introducing a regulatory reporting regime informed by robust academic research, the potential outcomes could lead to the market reaping the benefits of a more efficient and effective funds management industry. Our findings suggest that high frequency disclosure of portfolio holdings increases the accuracy with which reported holdings reflect the true performance of the underlying funds, without significantly impeding the competitiveness of funds that are most likely to be copied (i.e. top-quartile funds). We recognise that front-running of funds' transactions will still be a concern, however this requires a measure of skill in execution and is difficult to explicitly test ex-ante.
Disclosing portfolio holdings at monthly intervals results in inferred excess returns and volatilities that are significantly closer to those derived from daily holdings, particularly for top-quartile funds, where most investor interest is likely to be concentrated. We show that reporting at longer intervals significantly underestimates both the excess performance and volatility of top-tier funds, which may lead investors to undervalue these funds and underestimate the risks associated with these funds.
The results show that the perceived threat from copycat funds should not be a significant concern to top-tier funds because, at all reporting frequencies, these funds generate sufficient outperformance over the copycats to cover typical management fees.
On the other hand, copycat funds may provide additional incentive for poor-performing 
